Date of receipt: 07/09/2025 ORDER OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 5 September 2025 * «Remedies for failure to act – EC-Israel Association Agreement – Triggering of a targeted sanctions mechanism – Audit of all programs and cooperation activities with Israel – Failure to assign a direct and individual position – Formulation of a clear public position, in accordance with the positive obligation to prevent genocide – Act not subject to appeal – Manifest partial inadmissibility – Injunction – Manifest partial lack of jurisdiction»
In case T-482/25,
Association of Jurists for the Respect of International Law (JURDI),e
established in Paris (France), represented by Mr. A. Dorado Escobar, lawyer, applicant, against
Council of the European Union, and European Commission,
Defendants, THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), composed of Mr. J. Svenningsen (Rapporteur), President, Mr. J. Laitenberger and Mr. J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, Judges, Clerk: MV Di Bucci, renders the present judgment. * Language of proceedings: French.FR
ORDER OF 5. 9. 2025 – CASE T-482/25
Prescription
1. By its action based on Article 265 TFEU, the applicant, the Association of Jurists for Respect for International Law (JURDI), requests the Court, firstly, to find that the Council of the European Union and the European Commission unlawfully failed to act following its letters of 12 May 2025 in which it requested, firstly, the suspension of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, signed in Brussels on 20 November 1995 (OJ 2000, L 147, p. 3), secondly, the triggering of a sanctions mechanism on the basis of Article 29 TEU, thirdly, the launch of an audit of all existing cooperation programmes and activities between the European Union and the State of Israel with a view to their revision, and fourthly, the adoption of a a clear public position, in accordance with the positive obligation to prevent genocide and, secondly, to order the Council and the Commission to transmit to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Parliament, within one month of notification of the decision ending the present dispute, a joint follow-up report setting out the steps taken to implement the measures requested.
Place
2 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, where an appeal is manifestly inadmissible or where the Tribunal is manifestly incompetent to hear it, the Tribunal may decide to rule by way of a reasoned order, without continuing the proceedings.
3 In this case, the Court considers itself sufficiently informed by the documents in the file and decides, pursuant to this article, to rule without continuing the proceedings.
On the grounds for conclusions seeking a finding that the Council and the Commission unlawfully failed to act following the requests of the applicant seeking that they suspend the EC- association agreement Israel triggers a sanctions mechanism based on Article 29 TEU and launch an audit of all programs and existing cooperation activities between the Union and the State of Israel with a view to their revision
4. First, the applicant asserts that it has standing to bring the present action on the basis of the case law according to which an association is entitled to bring an action when it is itself affected by the contested measure. In this regard, it argues that its statutory mission is the prevention of international crimes and genocide, as well as the application of international law, and that this mission is rendered ineffective due to the omissions of the Council and the Commission.
5 In addition, the applicant argues that it is entitled to bring the present action as an association representing a legally protected collective interest.
6 In this context, the applicant further observes that even if the three measures requested were not addressed to her, this would not constitute an obstacle to the admissibility of the present action, given that, according to settled case law, for an action for failure to act to be admissible, it is not necessary for the omitted act to take the form of an individual decision. 7 Secondly, the applicant submits that she has standing to bring the present action because, firstly, the principle established by the General Court in its judgment of 27 January 2021, ClientEarth v EIB (T-9/19, EU:T:2021:42), according to which a non-governmental environmental protection organisation may invoke a legitimate interest in bringing an action where the act or inaction of an institution produces definitive legal effects that impair the fulfillment of its statutory mission, must be applied, in this case, by analogy. Indeed, the applicant considers that since the Union judge has recognized the admissibility of actions brought by civil society organisations working in areas of general interest enshrined in the treaties, in this case the environment, he should also recognize the admissibility of actions brought in the areas of international humanitarian law and fundamental rights.
8 Second, the applicant submits that, according to the judgment of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (C-362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40), it is not necessary for an applicant to suffer direct harm, but only for their legal situation to be identifiably affected by the contested omission. 9 Third, in the alternative, the applicant argues that even if its direct or individual impact were deemed insufficient, the specific nature of the present action, which aims to uphold international law and safeguard the fundamental values of the Union, would justify a flexible interpretation of the admissibility requirements.
10 In this regard, first of all, it should be recalled that, according to settled case law, Articles 263 and 265 TFEU are only the expression of one and the same legal procedure. It follows that, like Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU, which allows individuals to bring an action for annulment against an act of an institution not addressed to them, provided that the act concerns them directly and individually, or against regulatory acts that concern them directly and do not include implementing measures, Article 265, third paragraph, TFEU must be interpreted as also granting them the right to bring an action for failure to act against an institution that has failed to adopt an act that would have concerned them in the same way (see ORDER OF 5 September 2025 – CASE T-482/25, Order of 16 October 2017, Salehi v Commission, T-773/16, not published, EU:T:2017:739, paragraph 25 and the case law cited). In the present case, the applicant claims to be directly and individually affected by the inaction of the Council and the Commission.
11 Next, according to consistent case law, the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly affected by the measure that is the subject of the appeal requires that two conditions be cumulatively satisfied, namely that the measure, on the one hand, directly affects the legal situation of that person and, on the other hand, leaves no discretion to the addressees responsible for its implementation, the latter being purely automatic and arising solely from Union regulations, without the application of any other intermediate rules (see judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2/Parliament and Council, C-348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 43 and the case law cited).
12 Finally, case law has admitted the admissibility of appeals filed by associations in three well-defined scenarios. Firstly, there is the case in which a legal provision expressly recognizes a series of procedural powers for professional associations; secondly, the case in which the association represents the interests of companies which would be entitled to bring an action; and thirdly, the case in which the association is individualized because of the impact on its own interests as an association, and in particular because its position as negotiator is affected by the act whose annulment is sought (see orders of 30 September 1997, Federolio v Commission, T-122/96, EU:T:1997:142, paragraph 60 and the case law cited, and of 6 May 2020, Sabo ea v Parliament and Council, T-141/19, unpublished, EU:T:2020:179, paragraph 36 and the case law cited).
13 In the present case, firstly, with regard to the applicant’s argument that she is entitled to bring the present action insofar as her own interests are affected, it is sufficient to note that she provides no evidence to suggest that she is directly concerned within the meaning of the case law cited in paragraph 11 above, given that none of the three measures that the Council and the Commission allegedly failed to adopt would directly affect her legal situation by modifying her rights or obligations (see, by analogy, judgment of 29 September 2021, Società agricola Vivai Maiorana ea v Commission, T-116/20, EU:T:2021:632, paragraph 47).
14 In particular, the applicant's direct assignment cannot be established, as she claims, because of her statutory mission, which is based on the prevention of international crimes and genocide and on the mobilization of international law.
15 In this regard, indeed, an association or organisation constituted for the defence of the collective interests of a category of litigants cannot be regarded as being directly and individually concerned by an act of the JURDI / COUNCIL AND COMMISSION affecting the general interests of that category (judgment of 18 March 1975, Union syndicale-Service public européen ea v Council, 72/74, EU:C:1975:43, paragraph 17; see also, order of 28 July 2021, Dual Star Logistic ea v Parliament and Council, T-645/20, unpublished, EU:T:2021:507, paragraph 65 and the case law cited).
16 Furthermore, associations have no right, under the Union legal order, to have the objectives of their activities unaffected by acts of the Union. Thus, assuming that the acts claimed by the applicant or the alleged failure to adopt them have an impact on the activities it carries out and on its statutory mission, this would, in any event, be a factual and not a legal impact (see, by analogy, orders of 28 September 2016, PAN Europe ea v Commission, T-600/15, EU:T:2016:601, paragraph 40, and of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T-645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 63).
17 As regards the applicant’s argument that it is entitled to bring the present action as an association representing a legally protected collective interest, if that argument were to be understood as referring to the second scenario indicated in point 12 above, namely that in which the association acts in the interest of its members, it is sufficient to note that, for the same reasons as those indicated in point 13 above, the condition relating to direct impact is not met, given that the measures sought would not produce any direct effect on the legal situation of the applicant’s members.
18 Thus, insofar as the conditions of direct assignment and individual assignment are cumulative (Order of 11 November 2014, Nguyen v Parliament and Council, T-20/14, EU:T:2014:955, paragraph 55, and Judgment of 16 May 2018, Netflix International and Netflix v Commission, T-818/16, not published, EU:T:2018:274, paragraph 70), the applicant and its members not being directly concerned by the measures requested, it is superfluous to verify whether they are individually concerned by the said measures.
19 Nevertheless, in the present case, the Court considers that it is in the interests of the proper administration of justice to examine the condition relating to the individual assignment of the applicant (see, to that effect and by analogy, Order of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T-645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 64).
20 In this regard, it is sufficient to note that, on the one hand, according to settled case law, an association formed to promote collective interests cannot be considered as being individually concerned by an act affecting those interests (orders of 18 December 1997, Sveriges Betodlares and Henrikson v Commission, C-409/96 P, EU:C:1997:635, paragraph 45; of 11 April 2011, Département du Gers v Commission, T-482/10, not published, EU:T:2011:155, paragraph 25; and of 16 May 2013, BytyOKD v Commission, T-559/11, not published, ORDER OF 5. 9. 2025 – CASE T-482/25 EU:T:2013:255, paragraph 31). On the other hand, the applicant has not established how its status as an association charged with "contributing to the promotion, defence, respect and implementation of international law in France, Europe and the world in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" distinguishes it from that of other associations charged with the same tasks in other Member States or from any other person pursuing the same objective, by individualizing it within the meaning of Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU.
21 Thus, it must be concluded that the applicant also fails to meet the condition relating to individual assignment.
22 Secondly, as regards the applicant’s arguments relating to the judgments of 27 January 2021, ClientEarth/EIB (T-9/19, EU:T:2021:42) and of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds/Commission (C-362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40), the following should be noted.
23 As regards the judgment of 27 January 2021, ClientEarth v EIB (T-9/19, EU:T:2021:42), it is sufficient to note that the analogy proposed by the applicant is based on an erroneous premise.
24 Indeed, in the judgment of 27 January 2021, ClientEarth v EIB (T-9/19, EU:T:2021:42), the Court only recognized that a non-governmental environmental protection organisation was entitled to request the review of a decision of the board of directors of the European Investment Bank (EIB) adopted in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application to the institutions and bodies of the European Union of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (OJ 2006, L 264, p. 13).
25 The Court therefore limited itself to recognizing the admissibility of the application of a non-governmental environmental protection organisation in the context of an administrative procedure provided for by Regulation No 1367/2006, without ruling on the conditions of admissibility of the action before the courts of the Union provided for by Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU.
26 As regards the judgment of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission (C-362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40), it should be noted that it concerned the concept of an ’actable« and not the question of whether the act in question directly or individually concerned the applicant. Thus, since the legal and factual situation of the case that gave rise to that judgment is not comparable to that of the applicant, the latter cannot rely on that judgment.
27 Third, as regards the applicant’s argument that the admissibility requirements should be relaxed in this case, it suffices to note that while the admissibility requirements laid down in Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU, must indeed be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, such an interpretation must not lead to setting aside the conditions expressly laid down by that Treaty (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v Parliament and Council, C-583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 98; of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C-456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 44, and Order of the 4 June 2024, Medel ea/Council, T-530/22 to T-533/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:363, paragraph 113).
28 Accordingly, since the applicant cannot argue that she is directly and individually affected by the measures requested, as noted in paragraphs 13 to 21 above, a relaxation of the admissibility requirements would, in fact, mean setting aside the condition of direct impact which is expressly stated in Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU, which would be contrary to the case law referred to in paragraph 27 above.
29 Consequently, these grounds of appeal must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.
On the point of conclusions seeking a finding by the Court that the Council and The Commission unlawfully failed to act following his requests adopting a clear public position, in accordance with the positive obligation to prevention of genocide
30 As regards this ground of appeal, it should be recalled that, according to settled case law, an action for failure to act is intended to sanction the absence of a legally binding act (Order of 17 June 2025, Asociación de ciudadanos contra la corrupción y para la defensa del estado de derecho v Ombudsman, T-615/24, EU:T:2025:625, paragraph 14 and the case law cited therein). 31 However, it must be noted that adopting a clear public position, as advocated by the applicant, cannot be considered an act producing binding legal effects. Moreover, the applicant herself describes this position as «political».
32 Finally, even assuming that this position produces binding legal effects, the applicant would not be individually or directly concerned by it, given the considerations set out in points 13 to 21 above, and would therefore not be entitled, under the case law cited in points 10 to 12 above, to challenge its failure.
33 Accordingly, this head of submissions must be rejected as being manifestly inadmissible.
ORDER OF 5. 9. 2025 – CASE T-482/25
On the grounds of conclusions seeking an order from the Court to the Council and to the Commission to transmit to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Parliament, within one month of notification of the decision putting an end to the present dispute, a joint follow-up report setting out the steps taken to implement the requested measures
34 As regards this claim, it suffices to note that, in the context of judicial review based in particular on Article 265 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union lacks jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (see, to that effect, orders of 26 October 2011, Victoria Sánchez v Parliament and Commission, C-52/11 P, not published, EU:C:2011:693, paragraph 38, and of 24 November 2016, Petraitis v Commission, C-137/16 P, not published, EU:C:2016:904, paragraphs 31 and 32). 35 Consequently, this claim must be dismissed as having been brought before a court manifestly lacking jurisdiction.
36 In these circumstances, it follows from all the foregoing considerations that the action must be dismissed partly as being manifestly inadmissible and partly as being brought before a court which is manifestly incompetent to hear it, without it being necessary to notify the Council and the Commission.
On expenses
37 As this order was adopted before the application was served on the defendants and before they had been able to submit costs, it is sufficient to decide that the applicant shall bear her own costs, in accordance with Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure.
For these reasons, THE COURT (fifth chamber) orders:
1) The appeal is dismissed in part as manifestly inadmissible and in part as brought before a clearly established court Incompetent to know.
JURDI / COUNCIL AND C OMMISSION
2) The Association of Jurists for the Respect of International Law (JURDI) will bear its own costs.
Done in Luxembourg, on September 5, 2025.
The Clerk The President V. Di Bucci J. Svenningsen
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